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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WESTERN ROCK MISAPPREHENDS THE
STATUS OF THIS CASE ON APPEAL
Western Rock misapprehends this Court's standards of review when reviewing a motion
for summary judgment. Western Rock states the standards of review as follows:
Although a trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement
agreement is not reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there
was an abuse of discretion, the issue as to whether a contract
exists between the parties is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness, (citing John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment,
Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1994)1
This Court does not review this case under an abuse of discretion standard, if such a standard
actually exists, but under the standards applicable to summary judgment. The difference is
significant.
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 832, 937-38 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court discussed
the Appellate Court's standards of review. The Pena Court likened the degrees of discretion
afforded trial courts to a pasture surrounded by fences representing the law. The Court further
stated that to the extent that a pasture is small because the trial court is fenced in closely by the
appellate courts, the operative standard of review approaches a de novo review. Id. at 937. To
the extent that the pasture is large, the trial court has considerable freedom in applying a legal
principle to the facts, freedom to make decisions that appellate judges might disagree with, but
will not reverse. Said another way, the freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal. Id.

1

As discussed below, this case does not include the summary enforcement of a settlement
agreement, but instead the trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action involving a
contract dispute.
1

Western Rock urges that this Court review the proceedings below as if the trial court
were operating in a large, nearly unbounded pasture. In fact, all the cases cited by Western
Rock were reviewed by the appellate courts in this manner. See, e.g., John Deere Co. vs. A
& H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that "a trial court's
summary enforcement of a settlement agreement will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion). Couched in terms recognizable to Pena, the trial court operates within a large
pasture when summarily enforcing settlement agreements. So large is the pasture, that the trial
court can even be wrong without incurring reversal. This is a very difficult standard of review
to overcome on appeal.
However, and this is imp »rtant, the present case is before this Court for a review of the
trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment. Tri-County borrows from its main Brief
its previous statement with resper t to the applicable standard of review for a summary ju 'gmeni
motion, as follows:
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c);
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This Court accords "no deference to the
trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the
court's legal conclusions based on those facts." Kitchen v. Cal.
Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
832 P.2d 476 (1992). Additionally, this Court "review[s] all
relevant facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in
a light most favorable to the losing party." Id. This has been
interpreted to mean that this Court must accept Appellant's facts
as set forth before the trial court and in sworn testimony and they
determine whether the facts create genuine issues of material fact.
See, e.g., Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827
(Utah App. 1989). Under applicable standards of review, this
Court must resolve all doubts in favor of Appellant. Draper Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983). "If, after a
2

review of the record, it appears that there is a material factual
issue, [this Court is] compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Schettler, 768 P. 2d
950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). "One sworn statement under oath
[involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a
factual issue, thereby precluding the entry of summary
judgment.11 Id. With respect to this Court's handling of its
review of the facts in an appeal from a summary judgment motion,
it is improper for the trial court or this Court on appeal to weigh
the evidence or assess its credibility or make any determination
about the opposing party's ultimate chance of prevailing in a trial
on the merits. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright
& Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); accord Reeves v.
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App.
1988)."
(Emphasis added.)
If this standard of review were to be couched in terms recognizable to Pena, there is no
pasture.

Metaphorically, the trial court is locked in the barn and not even allowed out to

pasture. This Court reviews everything the trial court did in granting the motion for summary
judgment as a matter of law or, as stated by Pena, de novo. Also significant to this review is
that this Court must accept Appellant's facts as set forth before the trial court and in sworn
testimony and then determine whether the facts create genuine issues of material fact,
irrespective of the actions of the trial court.
There is a reason for critical review of summary judgment motions. Such motions are
generally made early in the proceedings before a party has had a full opportunity to develop and
present its case to the court. It follows, therefore, that one single material fact in dispute will
defeat a motion for summary judgment, thus affording the opposing party the opportunity to
present the issue to the fact finder.

Western Rock is essentially attempting to boot strap a

review of a grant of summary judgment into a proceeding where it would be reviewed for an

3

abuse of discretion. This position is contrary to law and would eviscerate this Court's ability
to carefully and critically review trial courts' grants of motions for summary judgment.
POINT II
WESTERN ROCK MISAPPREHENDS THE
STATUS OF THIS CASE BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT
Western Rock argues extensively on appeal that this case involves the summary
enforcement of a settlement agreement. All of the cases cited by Western Rock address the
summary enforcement of settlement agreements. As defined by the cases cited by Western
Rock, a settlement agreement is an agreement entered into after the initiation of litigation and
it is expressly and exclusively designed to end the litigation short of gcing to trial. See, e.g.,
John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, 876 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1994); Zions First National
Bank v. Barbara Jensen Inferiors, 781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989).2 The present case does

2
As stated in the text, the cases cited by Western Rock in support of its position are not
applicable to the present case. These cases are distinguishable based on the fact that they
involve settlement agreements entered into during litigation for the purpose of ending the
litigation and not disputes over contracts entered into prior to litigation and, further, none of
them involve a summary judgment proceeding.
In Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979) the court
was addressing the enforcement of a settlement agreement and not a contract dispute involving
a summary judgment proceeding.
In Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah App.
1989), the court was addressing the enforcement of a settlement agreement and not a contract
dispute involving a summary judgment proceeding.
In John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc., 876 P. 2d 880 (Utah App. 1994), the court
was addressing the enforcement of a settlement agreement and not a contract dispute involving
a summary judgment proceeding.
In Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, 866 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993), the court
was addressing the enforcement of a settlement agreement and not a contract dispute involving
a summary judgment proceeding.
4

not involve a settlement agreement—it involves a contract dispute and a summary judgment
proceeding.
Western Rock complained against Tri-County for breach of contract—breach of an alleged
contract entered into well in advance of the initiation of any litigation. (See Western Rock's
Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit A). Tri-County filed an Answer and included therein the
affirmative defenses that there was no meeting of the minds; that there was no mutual assent;
and that the money placed in escrow was done as a show of good faith and not pursuant to any
contract. (See Tri-County's Answer attached hereto as Exhibit B). This case, as framed before
the trial court, involves nothing more than a contract dispute including disputes over classic
contract principles such as "meeting of the minds" and "mutual assent." It does not involve a
settlement agreement.
As discussed above, the cases cited by Western Rock, without exception, involve
settlement agreements entered into between litigants during litigation for the purpose of settling
the litigation. If Western Rock and Tri-County had, after the initiation of litigation, entered into
settlement negotiations designed to end the litigation and had Western Rock brought a motion
to enforce a settlement agreement, Western Rock's cases and arguments may have some merit
and applicability to the present case. However, Western Rock and Tri-County have had no
discussions nor have they made any attempts to settle the present litigation-in fact, the law does
not require them to do so. As a result, the trial court was not called upon to summarily enforce
a settlement agreement entered into between the parties during the course of litigation, but
instead to interpret a contract allegedly entered into between the parties long before any
litigation—a far different determination. Additionally, the Court was not called upon to decide

5

a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, but instead to decide a motion for summary
judgment - - again, a far different determination.
POINT III
WESTERN ROCK INAPPROPRIATELY ARGUES THE
MERITS OF ITS CASE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT ON
APPEAL
In an appeal from a summary judgment proceeding, the merits of the case are beyond the
mandated review by this Court. Stated another way, the only question before this Court is
whether there is a material fact in dispute—not whether Western Rock or Tri-County would
ultimately prevail on the claims each has made to the trial court. See White v. Deseelhorst, 879
P.2d 1371 (Utah 1984) (holding that it is inappropriate for the appellate court to consider the
merits of the underlying claims on an appeal from a summary judgment—the court is obligated
to resolve all doubts in the opposing party's favor regardless of how the court feels about the
party's ability to ultimately succeed at trial). Nevertheless, and despite these mandates, Western
Rock attempts to argue the merits of its case on appeal without addressing or comprehending the
limited scope of this appeal.

Based on this miscomprehension, Western Rock makes the

following arguments on appeal that, in reality, are in dispute before the trial court:
A. Confirmation Memorandum
Western Rock argues that both it and Tri-County intended to be bound by Tri-County's
Confirmation Memo. However, Tri-County submitted an affidavit to the trial court from Terry
Weaver, who drafted the Confirmation Memo, which stated, in pertinent part, that:
It was my intention at the time that the terms discussed would not
be binding upon either party until the escrow documents had been
prepared by the attorney for Western Rock, reviewed by us and
our attorney, and signed by the parties. This was specifically
6

discussed by Mr. Smith and myself in our telephone conversation
and we agreed that neither party would be bound until the final
documents had been prepared and signed.
See Affidavit of Weaver, at 1 8, attached to Appellant's main Brief as Exhibit B). Thus,
Western Rock claims that Tri-County intended to be bound by a document that Tri-County
claims, through a sworn affidavit, that it had no intention to be bound by. This Court is
required, under the mandate of its standard of review in this matter, to accept the fact that TriCounty did not intend to be bound by the Confirmation Memo and then determine whether this
creates a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Beehive Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827. Since this
issue goes to the very heart of the litigation in this matter, this is a genuine issue of material fact
that should have precluded summary judgment.
B. Escrow Agreement
Western Rock argues that the Escrow Agreement contained the same terms and conditions
as the Confirmation Memo. Further, Western Rock argues that because Tri-County signed the
Escrow Agreement there was a mutual intent to be bound thereby.

However, Tri-County

submitted to the trial court an affidavit of Mr. Ronald Solt, Tri-County's Chief Financial
Officer, which stated, in pertinent part, that:
3. On or about November 8, 1995, I received a telephone
call from Wayne Smith, from Western Rock Products. I also
received a fax transmission by which an escrow agreement and a
document entitled Agreement were submitted to Tri-County for
signature.
These documents were submitted pursuant to
discussions between Mr. Smith and Terry Weaver of Tri-County.
4. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Wayne Smith and
I had a telephone conversation. Mr. Smith was in Utah. I was in
Pennsylvania. Mr. Smith advised me that unless Tri-County
signed the documents immediately, as drafted, Western Rock
intended to file a mechanic's lien. I expressed objection to his,
stating that Tri-County needed time to consult with its attorneys
7

and to review the documents in detail. At the time I did not know
the specifics of the terms discussed between Mr. Weaver and Mr.
Smith the day before.
5. Initially, Mr. smith remained firm in his position that
the documents had to be signed and returned, and the funds paid,
that day.
6. I contacted our attorney. Because he was in another
meeting, I only had the chance to talk to him briefly and he only
had the opportunity to review the documents briefly.
7. After the discussions with our attorney, I again
contacted Mr. Smith and explained to him the objections which I
had to the documents. Those objections included the following:
A. Tri-County objected to the release clause
obtained in the documents.
B. Tri-County objected to the fact that Western
Rock could unilaterally decide what efforts, if any, it
wanted to expend in pursuing Precise Concrete.
C. We did not have sufficient time to review the
agreement.
D. The agreement was couched in the terms of
payment to Western Rock, rather than as a reserve deposit.
E. The agreement eliminated the mutuality of
performance.
8. Mr. Smith continued to insist that the funds had to be
paid that day, and that the documents had to be signed. I
continued to insist that we would not sign the document as drafted.
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the
funds into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with
Southern Utah Title company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed,
this was done as a show of good faith but was not intended to
be a final agreement of the parties since the terms of the
agreement had not been reached.
10. I signed the escrow agreement, I deposited the
funds by wire transfer, and I sent a letter to Mr. Smith
indicating that all of this was done pending finalizing the final
terms of the agreement. A copy of my letter to Mr. Smith is
attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this
reference.
11. Mr. Smith and I expressly discussed and agreed
that this was not a final completed agreement because of the
unagreed terms.
12. There have been subsequent drafts of the agreement
exchanged since then. At this point, Tri-County does not desire
to pursue negotiations or discussions further and believes that the
8

negotiations are at an end without the completion of the contract
and believes that the funds should be returned to Tri-County.
(Emphasis added.) This Court is required, under the mandate of its standard of review in this
matter, to accept the fact that Tri-County did not intend the Escrow Agreement to be binding
because of disputed terms, and that Tri-County deposited the money and signed the agreement
under duress, but did so as a sign of good faith. See, e.g., Beehive Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827.
Since this issue again goes to the very heart of the litigation in this matter, this is a genuine issue
of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.
C. Western Rock's and Tri-County's Performance
Western Rock argues that the parties partly performed under the Escrow Agreement
thereby manifesting their intent to be bound thereby. Tri-County assumes that Western Rock
is referring to the money Tri-County placed in escrow as the basis for its "part performance"
argument. However, as discussed above, Tri-County submitted to the trial court Mr. Solt's
affidavit that discussed the reason the money was placed into escrow and that it was not pursuant
to an agreement and cannot be considered part performance. The relevant portion of Mr. Solt's
affidavit is revisited here:
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the
funds into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with
Southern Utah Title company. As Mr, Smith and I discussed,
this was done as a show of good faith but was not intended to
be a final agreement of the parties since the terms of the
agreement had not been reached.
(Emphasis added.) Western Rock argues that the money placed into escrow by Tri-County
demonstrates part performance while Tri-County argued, through a sworn affidavit, that the
money was placed in escrow as a show of good faith and not pursuant to a contract. This Court

9

is required, under the mandate of its standard of review in this matter, to accept the fact that
Tri-County placed the money in escrow as a show of good faith and not pursuant to contract and
that it therefore cannot be considered part performance of a contract. See, e.g., Beehive Brick
Co., 780 P.2d 827. This issue again goes to the very heart of the litigation in this matter and
therefore is a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.
Conclusion
Tri-County raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to all of Western Rock's
claims before the trial court and this Court should, therefore, reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.
POINT IV
WESTERN ROCK'S ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH
CRIMSON V. WESTERN COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
FROM THE PRESENT CASE MUST FAIL
Western Rock attempts to distinguish Crismon v. Western Company of North America, 742
P.2d 1219 (Utah App.

1987) from the present case because it involved a five year lease

agreement and was therefore, by operation of the Statute of Frauds, required to be in writing.
This argument is not compelling. The question in Crismon was whether there was a meeting
of the minds with respect to entering into the lease agreement. A lease agreement is contract
that, like any other contract whether written or oral, requires that there be a meeting of the
minds before the parties can be bound thereto. Crismon involved facts substantively similar to
the present case and is therefore worth revisiting.
In Crimson, the issue before the Court was whether an exchange of correspondence with
conflicting terms and statements constituted a meeting of the minds sufficient that the parties

10

could be bound by the terms and statements in the correspondence. The Court held that the
correspondence, even though it expressed the terms of the leases, did not constitute a contract
between the parties because they contemplated that another agreement to formalize the
transaction would be prepared. The Court stated, in pertinent part, that:
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not
formed without a meeting of the minds. [Contractual mutual
assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the same
sense so that their minds meet as to all terms. Determining
whether the specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement
requires an examination of the entire agreement and the
circumstances under which the agreement was entered into.
In this case, the language in Eppes' January 11 letter
indicates that the parties were still negotiating. The letter
states that Western's legal department would be sending a
prepared [contract]. This statement indicates that both parties
understood that a minding contract would be entered into in the
future. Subsequent correspondence between the parties also
demonstrates that the January 11 letter evidenced preliminary
negotiations. . . .
Finally, the subsequent leases exchanged by the parties
demonstrate that there was no meeting of the minds. Eppes
sent Crimson a [contract] which Crimson rejected by sending back
a lease with different terms with regard to term, rent,
maintenance, insurance and default. The parties' exchange of
proposed leases clearly demonstrates that they did not have a
meeting of the minds as to all the essential terms of the lease.
Id. at 1221-1222 (emphasis added).
Before making the obvious comparisons between Crismon and the present case, it is
worth noting that it is not incumbent upon this Court to actually determine whether there was
or was not a meeting of the minds, only whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether there was a meeting of the minds. Tri-County submits that there are numerous genuine
issues of material with respect to whether there was a meeting of the minds.

11

In both Crismon and the present case, the parties exchanged initial writings that expressed
that a subsequent document would be prepared. In both cases, one of the parties subsequently
prepared a more detailed agreement that contained terms and conditions that were not covered
in the original negotiations or correspondence. In both cases, the parties subsequently exchanged
several drafts of the anticipated final agreement. In Crismon, the Court held that the preliminary
correspondence did not demonstrate a meeting of the minds and that it did not therefore
constitute and agreement. In this case, while the correspondence does reflect that there was not
a meeting of the minds, there certainly is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there
was a meeting of the minds—and that is all this Court need determine.
Based on Crismon, there was no meeting of the minds in the present case. However, as
stated above, this Court need not make such a determination. This Court need only determine
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether there was a meeting of
the minds. Based on the sworn affidavits Tri-County submitted to the trial court, it is clear that
there are continuing issues of material fact with respect to this critical issue. This Court should
therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

12

POINT V
TRI-COUNTY'S EXCUSE FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN
THIS MATTER IS IRRELEVANT TO THE PRESENT
PROCEEDINGS
Western Rock argues that this Court should enforce the Settlement Agreement because
Tri-County's excuse for non-performance is comparatively unsubstantial. However, and again,
this is not an action to enforce a settlement agreement as settlement agreements have been
defined by the cases relied upon by Western Rock. This is, in fact, a classic contract dispute
and a review of a summary judgment proceeding. The issue is, therefore, not whether TriCounty's performance can be considered substantial or unsubstantial, but whether there was or
is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence or non-existence of a contract.
As set forth above, there are considerable genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether
or not the parties entered into a contract and this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.3
POINT VI
THE ENFORCEMENT OR NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FORMALIZED AGREEMENT IS IRRELEVANT IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS.
Western Rock argues that because Tri-County did not attempt to enforce the terms of the
formalized agreement it is, therefore, not relevant to the issue of whether or not the parties
entered into a contract.

Such an argument is without merit.

If anything, the formalized

agreement demonstrates that there were considerable genuine issues of material fact with respect

3
The issue of substantial and unsubstantial performance is a fact-sensitive issue that must
be determined by the trier of fact and is completely irrelevant to the present proceeding before
this Court.
13

to whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties. In Crismon, the court held
that the additional terms in the subsequent agreement was demonstrative of the fact that there
was no meeting of the minds. Crismon at 1221-1222. In the present case, the formalized
agreement is a clear indication that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties and the trial court therefore erred
in granting Western Rock's Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those set forth in Tri-County's main Brief,
there are numerous and substantial issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. The
trial court therefore erred in granting Western PvOck's Motion for Summary Judgment. This
court should therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
HIGBEE &l JENSEN/

fASM. HlGBEjE
iAINE T. HOFEI
attorneys for Deferid^jjt/Appellant)
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TERRY L. WADE - A3882
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE, WADE & SMART
A Professional Corporation
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771-0400
801/628-1611
TW:W:WRP: cm/2nd 013096 626343 twbj

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.
Judge _

TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS,
INC., a Pennsylvania corporation,
Defendant(s).

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through its counsel, Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom,
Drake, Wade & Smart, a professional corporation, and alleges against the Defendant
as follows:
PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

1.

Plaintiff,

WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS CORPORATION

(hereinafter "Plaintiff"),

is a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in Washington County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant,

TRI-COUNTY

CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS, INC. (hereinafter

"Defendant Tri-County"), is the General Contractor on a construction project
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(hereinafter "the Project") owned by Circle Four Realty, a dba of Carroll's Foods of UT,
Inc., West Isle Partners, Inc., Prestage Farms of Utah, Inc., and Smfthfield of Utah, Inc.
(hereinafter "Circle Four") located in Beaver County, Utah.
3.

Tri-County entered into a subcontract with Precise Concrete, Inc.

(hereinafter "Precise") whereby the latter agreed to perform concrete work on the
Project.
4.

On or about May 10, 1995, Precise entered into a Credit Agreement

(hereinafter the "Agreement") with Plaintiff, whereby Plaintiff agreed to furnish
materials to Precise on an open credit account for use on the aforedescribed Project.
Said Agreement provided that regular payments were to be made to Plaintiff by the
15th of each month and that interest would accrue on past due monthly balances at
the rate of 2 1 % per annum.
5.

Precise purchased materials on credit from Plaintiff between the dates of

approximately May 11, 1995, and August 30, 1995.
6.

The balance owing on Precise's account as of October 25, 1995, was

$190,332.37.
7.

Plaintiff has fully performed under the aforesaid Agreement by supplying

Precise with labor and materials.
8.

Notwithstanding Plaintiff's performance under the Agreement, Precise

has failed and refused to pay Plaintiff the balance of the correct amounts due and
owing under the Agreement, with interest, to-wit: $190,332.37.
9.

Plaintiff has made demand for the amount owing, but Precise has wholly

failed, neglected and refused to perform under the Agreement by paying all sums due
and owing to Plaintiff. As a result of Precise's refusal to pay the sums now due and
owing, Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $190,332.37, which includes interest,
at the rate of 2 1 % per annum to October 25, 1995.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Anticipatory Breach Of Contract)
10.

Paragraphs 1 through 9 of this Complaint are incorporated herein by this

reference.
11/

Plaintiff notified Circle Four (the owner of the Project) and Defendant Tri-

County (the general contractor on the Project) of Precise's default in its payment
obligations to Plaintiff.
12.

Furthermore, Plaintiff notified Circle hour ana Defendant Tri-County of its

intention to file a mechanic's lien upon the Project.
13.

Due to a pending financial transaction involving the Project as security,

Circle Four and Defendant Tri-County wished to avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien
upon the Project.
14.

To avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien by Plaintiff upon the Project,

Defendant Tri-County entered into an agreement with Plaintiff on or about November
7, 1995 (hereinafter the "Tri-County Agreement").
15.

Pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to forebear filing a

mechanic's lien upon the Project, and to use its best effort to collect monies owed and
resolve differences with Precise.
16.

Defendant Tri-County, pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement, placed

$185,317.26 in an interest-bearing escrow account.

These funds (hereinafter

"Escrowed Funds") were sent on or about November 8, 1995 and were payable to
Southern Utah Title Company in its capacity as escrow agent.
17.

Pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement, if after a six-month period (such

period ending May 8, 1996) Plaintiff had not collected the monies owed by Precise,
Plaintiff was entitled to receive the Escrowed Funds without interest and Defendant Tri-
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County was to receive a sum consisting of the interest which accrued on the Escrowed
Funds while in the escrow account.
18.

On or about January 22, 1996, Defendant Tri-County repudiated the Tri-

County Agreement informing Plaintiff and Southern Utah Title'Company that the
Escrowed Funds should be returned to Defendant Tri-County.
19.

Because~of Defendant Tri-County's anticipatory tfreach of the Tri-County

Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to treat the Tri-County Agreement as broken and collect
damages from Defendant Tri-County.
20.

Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $185,317.26.

21.

Additionally, pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement (as set forth in the

escrow instructions), Defendant Tri-County agreed to pay costs and reasonable
attorney's fees in enforcing the Tri-County Agreement.
22.

Plaintiff has, in fact, incurred costs and attorney's fees as the result of

Defendant Tri-County's failure to perform the Tri-County Agreement, and is therefore
entitled to be reimbursed for the same.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant TRI-COUNTY, for
$185,317.26, pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement, costs of collection, a reasonable
attorney's fee and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract)
23.

Paragraphs 1 through 22 of this Complaint are incorporated herein by

this reference.
24.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tri-County's actions on or about January

22, 1996, constitute a present breach of the Tri-County Agreement.
25.

Because of Defendant Tri-County's breach of the Tri-County Agreement,

Plaintiff has been damaged.
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26.

Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount equal to the amount of the

Escrowed Funds plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs in bringing/the^present action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant TRI-COUNTY, for
$185,317.26, pursuant to the Tri-County Agreement, costs of collection, a reasonable
attorney's fee and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief)
27.

Paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint are incorporated herein by

this reference.
28.

Despite Plaintiff's performance of the Tri-County Agreement in forbearing

to file a mechanic's lien and pursuing collection proceedings against Precise; and
Defendant Tri-County's partial performance of the Tri-County Agreement in placing
Funds in escrow, Defendant Tri-County presently claims there is no binding
agreement.
29.

Defendant Tri-County asserts that reference to a future, formal agreement

in the escrow instructions prevents the formation of a valid, present agreement.
30.

Despite reference to a future, formal agreement in the escrow

instructions, Plaintiff claims Defendant Tri-County received benefits from the TriCounty Agreement, signed a memorandum and escrow instructions representing the
essential terms of the Tri-County Agreement, and performed obligations evidencing an
agreement, and is presently estopped from urging that the Tri-County Agreement is not
enforceable because not reduced to a more formal writing.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks Declaratory Judgment determining:
1.

That a valid and enforceable agreement exists between Plaintiff and

Defendant Tri-County;
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2.

That Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, court costs, and other related

expenses incurred In the prosecution of this matter; and,
3.

Such other and further relief as to which the Court deems Plaintiff justly

and equitably entitled.
DATED THIS 3 £ f £ r d a y of (T*^—n

1996.

W, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE,
SNOW,
WADE & SMART
A Professional Corporation

U

<^Qj^y

TERRY L. WADE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address is:
820 North 1080 East
St. George, Utah 84770
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Exhibit B

IF 0 0,11(8
FEB 23 1996
THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484)
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main Street
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84721
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

ANSWER

Plaintiff,
vs.

TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

Civil No. 96-CV-15
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The Defendant above named, by and through counsel, hereby answers the Plaintiffs
Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1. The Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendant upon which
relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Defendant responds to the specific allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint as follows:

2. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are admitted.
3.

As to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, this Defendant is without sufficient

knowledge, information or belief to respond thereto and therefore denies same,
4. As to paragraph 10, the Defendant incorporates herein by reference its answers to
paragraphs 1 through 9.
5.

As to paragraphs 11 and 12, this Defendant admits that Plaintiff notified the

Defendant of the items referenced, but has no knowledge as to the truth or falsity of the items
stated.
6. Paragraph 13 is admitted.
7.

Paragraphs 14 and 15 are denied, in that the Defendant denies that a binding

agreement was ever reached. There were negotiations along these lines but there was not a
formal contract.
8. Paragraph 16 is admitted.
9. As to paragraph 17, this Defendant denies that there was ever a binding agreement
reached. Paragraph 17 is denied.
10. Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 are denied.
11. As to paragraph 23, this Defendant incorporates herein by reference its answers to
paragraphs 1 through 22.
12. Paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 are denied.
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13. As to paragraph 27, the Defendant incorporates herein by reference its answers to
paragraphs 1 through 26.
14. As to paragraph 28, the Defendant admits that Tri-County presently claims there is
no binding agreement. Tlie remainder of paragraph 28 is denied.
15. Paragraph 29 is admitted.
16. Paragraph 30 is denied.
17. The Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint that is not
specifically admitted herein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
18. There was no meeting of the minds in the formation of the alleged contract in this
case since the entire escrow agreement claimed by the Plaintiff is to be governed by a future,
formal agreement which was never reached.
19. There was no mutual assent to the formation of the alleged contract.
20. At the time the money was conveyed into escrow, it was done as a demonstration
of good faith, and nothing more, with the express understanding that the future formal agreement
was necessary in order to complete the escrow contract.
21. The Plaintiff is estopped from asserting the enforcement of the escrow contract.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that Plaintiff take nothing by its Complaint, that the
Plaintiffs cause of action be dismissed, and that this Court enter its declaratory judgment that
the alleged agreement set forth in the Plaintiffs Complaint is of no force and effect and that the
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Defendant is eQtiUed'to'tetuni-pffits.^fbnds from the Southern Utah Title Company escrow; plus
its costs, attorney's fees and such other and further relief as to the Court appears proper.
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of February, 1996.
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P C .

ASM. HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

^tlA

day of February, 1996, a true and correct copy of

the within and foregoing ANSWER was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771
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